Tag Archives: Conflict Early Warning

Tactical Survival in Conflict

An OCHA report on “the response strategies of internally displaced people found that their information-gathering systems were often highly developed and far superior to those of the humanitarian community.” So the task at hand is not to develop new tactics for survival but rather to learn from those who have survived and perished in conflict. As a seasoned practitioner with Medecins sans Frontiers stated,

“People will continue to survive as best they can, relying more on their own communities and traditional networks than on [us] … it is not the fault of the displaced persons and refugees, but our system for providing protection and assistance that does not work. They have, after all, had to learn the hard way what it takes to survive.

Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen echo this sentiment when they write,

“The empowerment of internally displaced persons has not received enough attention, despite the crucial role [they] play in meeting their own needs and influencing the course of conflict. In many situations internally displaced persons develop survival and coping strategies. In some, they and host communities develop self-defense units to ensure that people have time to flee.

To this end, studying and disseminating testimonies of those who survive violence can provide important insights into the numerous tried and true survival tactics. Luck may at times play a role in survival stories. But to quote the French scientist Louis Pasteur, “in the field of observation, chance favors only the prepared mind.” In any event, luck can be turned into knowledge, and knowledge into future tactics.

As Casey Barrs writes, communities in crises can learn from survival testimonies; “learn what dispersed and hidden livelihoods look like. They can be shown how they might dismantle their village homes and build temporary huts near their fields as the Vietnamese sometimes did in the face of American airpower. Or use crop colors and canopies that are less noticeable from the air, as Salvadoran peasants sometimes planted.” Understandably, “no sophisticated warning systems were available, so people had to develop their own skills in detecting and identifying aircraft.”

The following short testimonies are taken from the extensive research on civilian protection and humanitarian tactical training carried out by Casey Barrs.

East Timor, 1990s: “When we hid, we always hid in the forest. There were no more villages; the Indonesian Army had burned them all down. Each family hid by itself. We were more secure if we separated into many places in a given area, rather than all camping in one restricted area. There were a few hundred people with us altogether.”

Belorussia, 1940s: “Our camp was spread out in sections over an area of ten kilometers; special scouts would ride over the area to maintain contact between the difficult subunits … we remembered the Biblical phrase ‘should one part of the camp be attacked and overcome, the other part will remain.’ This strategy was used by our forefathers.”

Burma 1990s: “The armed opposition in Burma built early warning systems for civilians to monitor the risks of government attack. Monitoring systems can be as simple as a rotating networks of villagers taking up strategic outlook positions and sending runners to inform neighbors if troops are approaching. However, more advanced early warning systems utilize the radio transmitters of the armed opposition forces to prepare villagers for evacuation.”

El Salvador 1970s: “Salvadorans sometimes did their own preemptive migrations in order to outflank military sweeps. These defensive movements were called guindas. In groups ranging from a few dozen to as many as two or three hundred” the people hid during the day and moved at night, sometimes repeating this for a few weeks. Civilians would also set off firecrackers to warn others when they saw spotter planes. Said one observer, ‘they’re human radar, practical and self-taught; who knows how to do it, but they know that there’ s going to be a military operation.”

Uganda 1990s: “The residents of some threatened villages in Northern Uganda climb the mountainsides each night and sleep under animal hides tanned to look like rocks. Dig underground rooms for supplies and services adjunct to the encampment.”

The iRevolution question: what role can ICTs play in empowering local communities to help them get out of harm’s way?

Patrick Philippe Meier

People-Centered Conflict Early Warning

Conflict early warning works. Indeed, current and historical cases of nonviolent action may be the closest systematic examples or tactical parallels we have to people-centered disaster early warning systems. Planning, preparedness and tactical evasion, in particular, are central components of strategic nonviolence: people must be capable of concealment and dispersion. Getting out of harm’s way and preparing people for the worst effects of violence requires sound intelligence and timely strategic estimates, or situation awareness.

The literature on nonviolent action and civil resistance is rich with case studies on successful instances of early warning tactics for community empowerment. What are the characteristics of successful early warning case studies in the field of nonviolent action? Nonviolent early response uses local social networks as the organizational template of choice, in a mode different from our conventional and institutional approach to early warning. Networks have demonstrated a better ability to innovate tactically and learn from past mistakes. The incentives for members of local networks to respond early and get out of harm’s way are also incalculably higher than those at the institutional or international level since failure to do so in the former instance often means death.

Nonviolent action is non-institutional and operates outside the bounds of bureaucratic and institutionalized political channels. Nonviolent movements are locally led and managed. They draw on local meaning, culture, symbolism and history. They integrate local knowledge and the intimate familiarity with the geography and surrounding environment. They are qualitative and tactical, not quantitative and policy-oriented. Not surprisingly, successful cases of nonviolent action clearly reveal the pivotal importance of contingency planning and preparedness, actions that are particularly successful when embedded in local circumstances and local experience.

The iRevolution question is how social resistance groups can most effectively use ICTs to gain an asymmetric advantage over repressive regimes.

Patrick Philippe Meier

Conflict Early Warning Systems: No iRevolution

Convention conflict early warning systems are designed by us in the West to warn ourselves. They are about control. These systems are centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic and ineffective. And highly academic. Indeed, the vast majority of operational conflict early warning systems are little more than fancy databases used to store, retrieve and analyze data. The rhetoric is that these systems serve to prevent violence which is rather ironic since the vast majority of local communities at risk have never heard of our impressive sounding systems.

Lessons in this field are clearly not learned. Papers published by Rupensinghe (1988) and Walker (1992) could be published tomorrow with no changes and their recommendations would still be on target. Worst of all, the indicator of success for early warning systems is still the number of high-quality analytical reports produced.

Reports don’t protect people, nor do graphs. People protect themselves and others. And yet reports still get written albeit rarely read let alone ever acted upon. To be fair, however, those working on conventional early warning systems are constrained by political and institutional realities. The best that these systems can do is to build a paper trail of analysis and recommendations. In other words, convention early warning systems can be used for advocacy and lobbying, but to assume that they are appropriate for operational response is to be misguided (see Campbell and Meier 2007). Indeed the recent study by Susanna Campbell and myself showed that decision-making structures at the UN do not use analyses generated by formal early warning systems as input into the decision-making process.

In order for conventional early warning systems to engage in operational response, they would first require the paper trail, which would then be used to lobby the UN Secretariat and other member states, these actors would then have to place political and economic pressure on offending governments and/or non-state armed groups, and the latter would have to acquiesce. Now, exactly how often has this been successful? Exactly. The above process takes years and fails repeatedly.

It is high time we learn from other communities such as disaster management. The disaster community places increasing emphasis on the importance of people-centered early warning and response systems. They define the purpose of early warning as follows:

To empower individuals and communities threatened by hazards to act in sufficient time and in an appropriate manner so as to reduce the possibility of personal injury, loss of life, damage to property and the environment, and loss of livelihoods.

The day our conflict early warning community adopts this discourse will be a good day. I hope to still be around to toast the breakthrough. Clearly, the discourse in disaster management shifts away from the conventional top-down division of labor between the “warners” and “responders” to one of individual empowerment. In disaster management, this means capacity building by training in preparedness and contingency planning. In other words, the disaster management community focuses on both forecasting hazards and mitigating their impact when they turn into disasters.

Question: Why are we in the conflict early warning community obsessed with forecasting despite our dismal track record? The disaster community is better able to forecast than we are, yet they allocate significant resources towards community-based preparedness and contingency planning programs. So when disaster does strike, the communities (who are by definition the first responders) can manage their own security environment without the immediate need for external intervention. There would be an uproar (and an escalation in disaster deaths) if the disaster community were to focus solely on prediction.

And what do we do? We work in conflict prone places and set up conflict early warning systems. When the violence escalates, we evacuate all international staff and leave the local communities behind to face the violence by themselves. How often do our conflict early warning systems fail? As often as we evacuate our staff. At the very, very least we should be preparing at-risk communities for the violence and engaging them in contingency planning so that when violence does strike, they at least have the training to get out of harm’s way and survive.

In a future blog, I will write about how some at-risk communities already do get of harm’s way, and effectively so.

Patrick Philippe Meier

InSTEDD Edited: Humanitarian Technology Review

At TED 2006, Google.org’s Executive Director Larry Brilliant made a wish called InSTEDD: to use the Internet as an early warning system for the outbreak of diseases. Larry’s InSTEDD originally stood for the International System for Total Early Disease Detection. He based his wish on Canada’s Global Public Health Information Network (GPHIN) which had detected the early outbreak of SARS by crawling the web (including blogs) for key words (symptoms) in multiple languages.

Larry got his wish and put Peter Carpenter at the helm of InSTEDD. In early 2007, Peter and his team held a number of meetings with UN agencies in Geneva and New York (which I actively participated in) to map out current gaps in the humanitarian community vis-a-vis information communication technology. The winds began to change around mid-2007 and by the Fall an entirely new team lead by Eric Rasmussen (former Navy Fleet Surgeon) and Robert Kirkpatrick (formerly with Microsoft) changed InSTEDD’s course. I have had several engaging conversations with them in both Boston and Geneva. Robert is particularly keen on taking a more decentralized approach to early warning and response; rather refreshing and rare.

In between my meetings with Peter’s team and Eric’s, InSTEDD was edited to mean “Innovative Solutions to Emergencies, Diseases and Disasters,” and subsequently re-edited with the word Solutions switched to Support. This editing necessarily expanded InSTEDD’s focus and within a few short months, the new InSTEDD team quickly positioned itself as the new doctor on the block for the humanitarian community’s ailing information communication technologies (ICTs).

At TED 2008, the InSTEDD team officially announced their plan to spearhead a new journal entitled “Humanitarian Technology Review“. While I share some of the same concerns articulated by Paul Curion, the public health and disaster management communities have almost always been ahead in their adoption of new ICTs compared to the conflict prevention and conflict early warning community. At the end of the day, whether in disaster or conflict zones, ICTs can provide much needed real-time and geo-referenced information for situational awareness.

Patrick Philippe Meier