Tag Archives: Tactical Survival

Burma and the Responsibility to Empower

The military dictatorship’s blocking of foreign aid to Burma/Myanmar has drawn worldwide condemnation. For me, however, the crux of the problem is twofold: first, the tradition of external response, and second, the nature consensual intervention. It is high time we shift to people-centered disaster/conflict early warning & response.

The UN’s Global Survey of Early Warning Systems for natural disasters defines the purpose of people-centered early warning systems as follows:

To empower individuals and communities threatened by hazards to act in sufficient time and in an appropriate manner so as to reduce the possibility of personal injury, loss of life, damage to property and the environment, and loss of livelihoods.

Precisely because of cases like that of Burma, the international humanitarian community should focus more seriously on “the capacity of disaster-affected communities to ‘bounce back’ or to recover with little or no external assistance following a disaster”  (Manyena 2006). The question that most interests me is how information communication technology can increase community resilience to disasters and conflict.

Humanitarian aid and disaster response is still subject to the principle of state sovereignty. This in part continues to plague international responses to violent conflict such as the genocide in the Sudan. State-based intervention is anything but timely and efficient. This is why the humanitarian community should consider more decentralized and tactical approaches to rapid response. The field of strategic nonviolent action is specifically focused on these types of responses. The humanitarian community should take heed.

We need a far more cross-disciplinary approach to humanitarian response; one that does not divide disaster response from conflict prevention. And one that does not shy away from a more tactical and proactive approach to saving lives.

Patrick Philippe Meier

Technology and Survival

People-centered early warning is about empowering at-risk communities so that they may get out of harm’s way when conflict escalates in their direction. I have already blogged about the use of technology for survival in areas of conflict: see Fallujah, El Salvador and an overview here. I have also noted that the disaster management community tends to adopt new technology long before the conflict prevention community does. Today’s Wired magazine features a neat review of “Survival Gear that’s Just Crazy Enough to Work.” While the review does not evaluate the gear for purposes of survival in conflict zones, at least two types of gear reviewed may be relevant.

Take for example the Bedu Emergency Rapid Response kit below. The kit fits in a keg-sized drum and is designed to “support eight adults for up to five years and it includes a water-filtration system, medicine and tool kits, a multi-fuel stove, a radio and a hand-crank generator with a photovoltaic battery pack and a strip-cell blanket. Not only that, but the skeleton of the barrel can be used to create a shelter.”

As Wired’s editors note, packing up the drum may take hours, which is not particularly useful in crisis zones when minutes can make the difference between life and death. However, alternative versions of the kit could be designed for quick set-up and quick packing. The drum could also be buried for later use if carrying it with were not an option.

Perhaps of more interest is the Grundig Eton Radio below. This device “includes AM/FM and weather-band frequencies, a two-way walkie-talkie channel, a flashlight, a siren, a beacon light and a cellphone charger.” According to Wired, the radio is also incredibly tough and only $150.

Patrick Philippe Meier

Tactical Survival in El Salvador

The story of El Salvador is one that gets little attention in the mainstream media on conflict early warning and operational response. Indeed, the story surfaces instead in the sociology and nonviolence literature. The best study on countering attack in El Salvador is Barton Meyer‘s “Defense Against Aerial Attack in El Salvador” published in 1994. Brian Martin, a prolific author in the field of nonviolent action, drew on Meyer’s case study in his excellent book on “Technology for Nonviolent Struggle” published in 2001. Finally, Casey Barrs, a Senior Protection Fellow, who has carried out substantial research in civilian protection, brought the story to my attention in 2006.

From Martin:

To survive bombing from El Salvador’s air force, both civilians and guerrillas developed and used a range of methods. No sophisticated warning systems were available, so people had to develop their own skills in detecting and identifying aircraft. When spotter planes were seen, people froze in place so they wouldn’t be seen; any moving target was subject to attack. When the spotter plane changed course, people would seek shelter, sometimes setting off a firecracker to warn others.

Concealment was widely used. Leafy trees were grown next to houses to hide them. Houses that were partly destroyed were left unrepaired to hide the fact that they were still being lived in. At the sound of aircraft, fires were quickly doused; alternatively, underground ovens were used with long tunnels to absorb smoke. Radio transmissions were not used by guerrillas to avoid being intercepted. Peasants wore dark clothing to avoid detection. They grew crops whose colour was not readily noticeable from the air and crops that were hidden by other plants.

Shelters were built and disguised. Natural features, such as forests and ravines, were also used for shelter. Guerrillas built extensive tunnel systems. In areas subject to frequent attack, shelter drills were carried out. When the government army invaded following air attack, guerrillas often would lead an evacuation of the
population, returning later.

The guerrillas, in the face of heavy air attack, dispersed their forces to groups of 4 to 15 fighters spread out over hundreds of meters. Larger units would have been more vulnerable to air power. The dispersed fighters were concentrated only for attacks or briefly at night. Another tactic was to deploy the guerrillas very near to government troops, where aerial attack might harm the government’s own soldiers.

As well as methods of surviving attack, other techniques of struggle were used, such as broadcasting reports of deaths or injuries of civilians due to air attack. Such human rights appeals were highly effective, and would be even more so in the context of a purely nonviolent resistance.

There is a great need for many more studies like that of Meyers, as well as a need to circulate the findings to people who can use them. Unfortunately, the contemporary field of disaster studies has neglected the study of war as a disaster. One factor behind this may be that most war disasters occur in poor countries whereas disaster studies are largely carried out in the rich countries which sponsor and provide weapons for these wars.

As well as knowing how to respond to aerial attack, there are many other areas in need of investigation, including firearms, landmines, biological agents, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons. A first step would be to provide basic technical information that is accessible to nonspecialists and which can be used to provide a realistic assessment of dangers and possibly to expose uses of the weapons.

My iRevolution question: some 14 years later, how can at-risk communities today use ICTs to get out of harm’s way? Conflict prevention can no longer afford to be a non cross-disciplinary effort. We in the conflict early warning community have much to learn from lessons learned in nonviolent action and tactical survival. For more examples of survival tactics in conflict, please see my previous blog entry and this piece by Casey Barrs.

Patrick Philippe Meier

Tactical Survival in Conflict

An OCHA report on “the response strategies of internally displaced people found that their information-gathering systems were often highly developed and far superior to those of the humanitarian community.” So the task at hand is not to develop new tactics for survival but rather to learn from those who have survived and perished in conflict. As a seasoned practitioner with Medecins sans Frontiers stated,

“People will continue to survive as best they can, relying more on their own communities and traditional networks than on [us] … it is not the fault of the displaced persons and refugees, but our system for providing protection and assistance that does not work. They have, after all, had to learn the hard way what it takes to survive.

Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen echo this sentiment when they write,

“The empowerment of internally displaced persons has not received enough attention, despite the crucial role [they] play in meeting their own needs and influencing the course of conflict. In many situations internally displaced persons develop survival and coping strategies. In some, they and host communities develop self-defense units to ensure that people have time to flee.

To this end, studying and disseminating testimonies of those who survive violence can provide important insights into the numerous tried and true survival tactics. Luck may at times play a role in survival stories. But to quote the French scientist Louis Pasteur, “in the field of observation, chance favors only the prepared mind.” In any event, luck can be turned into knowledge, and knowledge into future tactics.

As Casey Barrs writes, communities in crises can learn from survival testimonies; “learn what dispersed and hidden livelihoods look like. They can be shown how they might dismantle their village homes and build temporary huts near their fields as the Vietnamese sometimes did in the face of American airpower. Or use crop colors and canopies that are less noticeable from the air, as Salvadoran peasants sometimes planted.” Understandably, “no sophisticated warning systems were available, so people had to develop their own skills in detecting and identifying aircraft.”

The following short testimonies are taken from the extensive research on civilian protection and humanitarian tactical training carried out by Casey Barrs.

East Timor, 1990s: “When we hid, we always hid in the forest. There were no more villages; the Indonesian Army had burned them all down. Each family hid by itself. We were more secure if we separated into many places in a given area, rather than all camping in one restricted area. There were a few hundred people with us altogether.”

Belorussia, 1940s: “Our camp was spread out in sections over an area of ten kilometers; special scouts would ride over the area to maintain contact between the difficult subunits … we remembered the Biblical phrase ‘should one part of the camp be attacked and overcome, the other part will remain.’ This strategy was used by our forefathers.”

Burma 1990s: “The armed opposition in Burma built early warning systems for civilians to monitor the risks of government attack. Monitoring systems can be as simple as a rotating networks of villagers taking up strategic outlook positions and sending runners to inform neighbors if troops are approaching. However, more advanced early warning systems utilize the radio transmitters of the armed opposition forces to prepare villagers for evacuation.”

El Salvador 1970s: “Salvadorans sometimes did their own preemptive migrations in order to outflank military sweeps. These defensive movements were called guindas. In groups ranging from a few dozen to as many as two or three hundred” the people hid during the day and moved at night, sometimes repeating this for a few weeks. Civilians would also set off firecrackers to warn others when they saw spotter planes. Said one observer, ‘they’re human radar, practical and self-taught; who knows how to do it, but they know that there’ s going to be a military operation.”

Uganda 1990s: “The residents of some threatened villages in Northern Uganda climb the mountainsides each night and sleep under animal hides tanned to look like rocks. Dig underground rooms for supplies and services adjunct to the encampment.”

The iRevolution question: what role can ICTs play in empowering local communities to help them get out of harm’s way?

Patrick Philippe Meier

People-Centered Conflict Early Warning

Conflict early warning works. Indeed, current and historical cases of nonviolent action may be the closest systematic examples or tactical parallels we have to people-centered disaster early warning systems. Planning, preparedness and tactical evasion, in particular, are central components of strategic nonviolence: people must be capable of concealment and dispersion. Getting out of harm’s way and preparing people for the worst effects of violence requires sound intelligence and timely strategic estimates, or situation awareness.

The literature on nonviolent action and civil resistance is rich with case studies on successful instances of early warning tactics for community empowerment. What are the characteristics of successful early warning case studies in the field of nonviolent action? Nonviolent early response uses local social networks as the organizational template of choice, in a mode different from our conventional and institutional approach to early warning. Networks have demonstrated a better ability to innovate tactically and learn from past mistakes. The incentives for members of local networks to respond early and get out of harm’s way are also incalculably higher than those at the institutional or international level since failure to do so in the former instance often means death.

Nonviolent action is non-institutional and operates outside the bounds of bureaucratic and institutionalized political channels. Nonviolent movements are locally led and managed. They draw on local meaning, culture, symbolism and history. They integrate local knowledge and the intimate familiarity with the geography and surrounding environment. They are qualitative and tactical, not quantitative and policy-oriented. Not surprisingly, successful cases of nonviolent action clearly reveal the pivotal importance of contingency planning and preparedness, actions that are particularly successful when embedded in local circumstances and local experience.

The iRevolution question is how social resistance groups can most effectively use ICTs to gain an asymmetric advantage over repressive regimes.

Patrick Philippe Meier