The Role of Facebook in Disaster Response

I recently met up with some Facebook colleagues to discuss the role that they and their platform might play in disaster response. So I thought I’d share some thoughts that come up during the conversation seeing as I’ve been thinking about this topic with a number of other colleagues for a while. I’m also very interested to hear any ideas and suggestions that iRevolution readers may have on this.

There’s no doubt that Facebook can—and already does—play an important role in disaster response. In Haiti, a colleague used Facebook to recruit hundreds of Creole speaking volunteers to translate tens of thousands of text messages into English as part of our Ushahidi-Haiti crisis mapping efforts. When an earth-quake struck New Zealand earlier this year, thousands of students organized their response via a Facebook group and also used the platform’s check-in’s feature to alert others in their social network that they were alright.

But how else might Facebook be used? The Haiti example demonstrates that the ability to rapidly recruit large numbers of volunteers is really key. So Facebook could create a dedicated landing page when a crisis unfolds, much like Google does. This landing page could then be used to recruit thousands of new volunteers for live crisis mapping operations in support of humanitarian organizations (for example). The landing page could spotlight a number of major projects that new volunteers could join, such as the Standby Volunteer Task Force (SBTF) or perhaps highlight the deployment of an Ushahidi platform for a particular crisis.

The use of Facebook to recruit volunteers presents several advantages, the most important ones being identity and scale. When we recruited hundreds of new volunteers for the Libya Crisis Map in support of the UN’s humanitarian response, we had to vet and verify each and every single one of them twice to ensure they were who they really said they were. This took hours, which wouldn’t be the case using Facebook. If we could set up a way for Facebook users to sign into an Ushahidi platform directly from their Facebook account, this too would save many hours of tedious work—a nice idea that my colleague Jaroslav Valuch suggested. See Facebook Connect, for example.

Facebook also operates at a scale of more than half-a-billion people, which has major “Cognitive Surplus” potential. We could leverage Facebook’s ad services as well—a good point made one Facebook colleague (and also Jon Gosier in an earlier conversation). That way, Facebook users would receive targeted adds on how they could volunteer based on their existing profiles.

So there’s huge potential, but like much else in the ICT-for-you-name-it space, you first have to focus on people, then process and then the technology. In other words, what we need to do first is establish a relationship with Facebook and decide on the messaging and the process by which volunteers on Facebook would join a volunteer network like the Standby Volunteer Task Force and help out on an Ushahidi map, for example.

Absorbing several hundred or thousands of new volunteers is no easy task but as long as we have a simple and efficient micro-tasking system via Facebook, we should be able to absorb this surge. Perhaps our colleagues at Facebook could take the lead on that, i.e, create a a simple interface allowing groups like the Task Force to farm out all kinds of micro-tasks, much like Crowdflower, which already embeds micro-tasks in Facebook. Indeed, we worked with Crowdflower during the floods in Pakistan to create this micro-tasking app for volunteers.

As my colleague Jaroslav also noted, this Mechanical Turk approach would allow these organizations to evaluate the performance of their volunteers on particular tasks. I would add to this some gaming dynamics to provide incentives and rewards for volunteering, as I blogged about here. Having a public score board based on the number of tasks completed by each volunteer would be just one idea. One could add badges, stickers, banners, etc., to your Facebook profile page as you complete tasks. And yes, the next question would be: how do we create the Farmville of disaster response?

On the Ushahidi end, it would also be good to create a Facebook app for Ushahidi so that users could simply map from their own Facebook page rather than open up  another browser to map critical information. As one Facebook colleague also noted, friends could then easily invite others to help map a crisis via Facebook. Indeed, this social effect could be most powerful reason to develop an Ushahidi Facebook app. As you submit a report on a map, this could be shared as a status update, for example, inviting your friends to join the cause. This could help crisis mapping go viral across your own social network—an effect that was particularly important in launching the Ushahidi-Haiti project.

As a side note, there is an Ushahidi plugin for Facebook that allows content posted on a wall to be directly pushed to the Ushahidi backend for mapping. But perhaps our colleagues at Facebook could help us add more features to this existing plugin to make it even more useful, such add integrating Facebook Connect, as noted earlier.

In sum, there are some low hanging fruits and quick wins that a few weeks of collaboration with Facebook could yield. These quick wins could make a really significant impact even if they sound (and are) rather simple. For me, the most exciting of these is the development of a Facebook app for Ushahidi.

Harnessing Social Media Tools to Fight Corruption

I had the distinct pleasure of being interviewed for this report on Harnessing Social Media Tools to Fight Corruption (PDF). The study was prepared by Dana Bekri, Brynne Dunn, Isik Oguzertem, Yan Su and Shivani Upreti as part of a final project for their degree from the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). The report was prepared for Transparency International (TI).

As part of this project, the authors compiled a very useful database of projects that apply social tools to create greater transparency and accountability around corruption issues. The authors recommend that TI draw on this list of projects to catalyze an active network of civil society initiatives that challenge corruption. The report also includes an interesting section on Mobilizing Volunteers and considers the role of volunteer networks as important in the fight against corruption. The authors write that,

“As an essential expression of citizenship and democracy, the past 25 years have seen rapid growth in the practice of volunteering worldwide. One study reports approximately 20.8 million volunteers in 37 countries, contributing US$ 400 billion to the world economy. The increasing enthusiasm of individuals to serve a cause while improving their own skills complements key goals of civil society organisations to build a strong volunteer force.”

This of course relates directly to the Standby Volunteer Task Force (SBTF), so I’m always keen to learn more about lessons learned and best practices in catalyzing a thriving volunteer network.

Do let me know if you’d like to get in touch with the authors, I’d be happy to provide an introduction via email.

Discussing the Recommendations of the Disaster 2.0 Report

It’s been well over a month since the Disaster 2.0 Report was publicly launched and while some conversations on the report have figured on the Crisis Mappers Network list-serve and the Standby Task Force blog, much of this discussion has largely overlooked the report’s detailed recommendations. I had hoped by now that someone would have taken the lead on catalyzing a debate around these recommendations, but since that still hasn’t happened, I might as well start.

The report’s authors clearly state that, “the development of an interface between the Volunteer and Technical Communities (V&TCs) and formal humanitarian system is a design problem that must be left to the stakeholders.” In addition, they clarify that “the purpose of this document is not to set forth the final word on how to connect new information flows into the international humanitarian system; but to initiate a conversation about the design challenges involved with this endeavor.” This conversation has yet to happen.

While the humanitarian community has proposed some design ideas, V&TCs have not responded in any detail to these proposals—although to be fair, no deadline for feedback has been suggested either. In any case, the proposed designs are meant to create an interface between humanitarian organizations and V&TCs—the two main stakeholders discussed in the Disaster 2.0 Report. It would be unfortunate and probably defeat the purpose of the report if the final interface were operationalized before any V&TCs had the chance to explain what would work best for them in terms of interface. Indeed, without an open and pro-active conversation that includes both stakeholder groups, it is unlikely that the final interface design will gain buy-in from both groups, which would result in wasted funding.

So here’s an open and editable Google Doc that includes the report’s recommen-dations. I have already added some of my comments to the Google Doc and hope others will as well. On June 1st, I will publish a new blog post that will summarize all the feedback added to the Google Doc. I hope this summary will serve to move the conversations forward so we can co-develop an interface that will prove useful and effective to all those concerned.

Analyzing U-Shahid’s Election Monitoring Reports from Egypt

I’m excited to be nearing the completion of my dissertation research. As regular iRevolution readers will know, the second part of my dissertation is a qualitative and comparative analysis of the use of the Ushahidi platform in both Egypt and the Sudan. As part of this research, I am carrying out some content analysis of the reports mapped on U-Shahid and SudanVoteMonitor. The purpose of this blog post is to share my preliminary analysis of the 2,700 election monitoring reports published on U-Shahid during Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections in November & December 2010.

All of U-Shahid‘s reports are available in this Excel file. The reports were originally submitted in Arabic, so I’ve had them translated into English for my research. While I’ve spent a few hours combing through these reports, I’m sure that I didn’t pick up on all the interesting ones, so if any iRev readers do go through the data, I’d super grateful if you could let me know about any other interesting tid-bits you uncover.

Before I get to the content analysis, I should note that the Development and Institutionalization Support Center (DISC)—the Egyptian group based in Cairo that launched the U-Shahid project—used both crowdsourcing and “blogger-sourcing.” That is, the group trained some 130 bloggers and activists in five key cities around Egypt to monitor the elections and report their observations in real-time on the live map they set up. For the crowdsourced reports, DISC worked with a seasoned journalist from Thomson-Reuters to set up verification guidelines that allowed them to validate the vast majority of such reports.

My content analysis of the reports focused primarily on those that seemed to shed the most transparency on the elections and electoral campaigns. To this end, the analysis sought to pick up any trends or recurring patterns in the U-Shahid reports. The topics most frequently addressed in the reports included bribes for buying off votes, police closing off roads leading to polling centers, the destruction and falsification of election ballets, evidence of violence in specific locations, the closing of polling centers before the official time and blocking local election observers from entering polling centers.

What is perhaps most striking about the reports, however, are how specific they are and not only in terms of location, e.g., polling center. For example, reports that document the buying of votes often include the amount paid for the vote. This figure varied from 20 Egyptian Pounds (about $3) to 300 Egyptian Pounds (around $50). As to be expected, perhaps, the price increased through the election period, with one report citing that the bribe price at one location had gone from 40 Pounds to 100 over night.

Another report submitted on December 5, 2010 was even more specific: “Buying out votes in Al Manshiaya Province as following: 7:30[am] price of voter was 100 pound […]. At 12[pm] the price of voter was 250 pound, at 3 pm the price was 200 pound, at 5 pm the price was 300 pound for half an hour, and at 6 pm the price was 30 pound.” Another report revealed “bribe-fixing” by noting that votes ranged from 100-150 Pounds as a result of a “coalition between delegates to reduce the price in Ghirbal, Alexandria.” Other reports documented non-financial bribes, including mobile phones, food, gas and even “sex stimulators”, “Viagra” and “Tramadol tablets”.

Additional incidents mapped on the Ushahidi platform included reports of deliberate power cuts to prevent people from voting. As a result, one voter complained in “Al Saaida Zaniab election center: we could not find my name in voters lists, despite I voted in the same committee. Nobody helped to find my name on list because the electricity cut out.” In general, voters also complained about the lack of phosphoric ink for voting and the fact that they were not asked for their IDs to vote.

Reports also documented harassment and violence by thugs, often against Muslim Brotherhood candidates, the use of Quran verses in election speeches and the use of mini buses at polling centers to bus in people from the National Party. For example, one reported noted that “Oil Minister Samir Fahmy who is National nominee for Al Nassr City for Peoples Council uses his power to mobilize employees to vote for him. The employees used the companies buses carrying the nominee’ pictures to go to the election centers.” Several hundred reports included pictures and videos, some clearly documenting obvious election fraud. In contrast, however, there were also several reports that documented calm, “everything is ok” around certain voting centers.

In a future blog post, I’ll share the main findings from my interviews with the key Egyptian activists who were behind the U-Shahid project. In the meantime, if you choose to look through the election monitoring reports, please do let me know if you find anything else of interest, thank you!

Video: Changing the World, One Map at a Time

Hosted in the beautiful city of Berlin, Re:publica 2011 is Germany’s largest annual conference on blogs, new media and the digital society, drawing thousands of participants from across the world for three days of exciting conversations and presentations. The conference venue was truly a spectacular one and while conference presentations are typically limited to 10-20 minutes, the organizers gave us an hour to share our stories. So I’m posting the video of my presentation below for anyone interested in learning more about new media, crowdsourcing, crisis mapping, live maps, crisis response, civil resistance, digital activism and check-in’s. I draw on my experience with Ushahidi and the Standby Volunteer Task Force (SBTF) and share examples from Kenya, Haiti, Libya, Japan, the US and Egypt to illustrate how live maps can change the world. My slides are available on Slideshare here.

Mobile Banking and the Dictator’s Dilemma: The Piggy Bank Theory of Digital Activism

The term “mobile banking” was not something I expected to hear during Berkeley’s recent Technology and Human Rights conference. But in his closing speech, Eric Brewer briefly mentioned mbanking in the context of repressive regimes shutting down cell phone networks. More specifically, as mobile banking services continue to grow in developing countries, so do the opportunity costs of interrupting access to mobile phone networks. While Eric didn’t refer to the “Dictator’s Dilemma” or Ethan Zuckerman’s “Cute Cat Theory”, he was describing those dynamics.

The Dictator’s Dilemma suggests that repressive regimes are incurring increasing opportunity costs when they decide to cut access to the Internet and/or cell phone networks. The theory suggests that doing so incurs financial and ultimately political costs. The term was coined by Christopher Kedzie who wrote that an increase in the relevance of digital/networked technologies will force repressive regimes to face a dilemma, where they will have to choose between open communications, which encourage economic development, and closed communication, which may help control ‘dangerous’ ideas but may hinder access to the information economy.

Ethan’s “Cute Cat Theory” relates to the notion that most web (and mobile phone) users access online content for entertainment purposes, e.g., to look at pictures of cute cats. If repressive regimes block access to socially entertaining sites like Flickr, YouTube, Facebook, etc, this may backfire by possibly politicizing a large user base that until then was largely apolitical. In his recent talk at the Share Conference, Sami Gharbia described a related dynamic. The regime’s decision to block social media sites drove a large number of new users to Facebook as this remained one of the only non-censored social networking platforms available to Tunisians. This in turn made it near impossible for the regime to shut access to Facebook without serious blowback.

So how does this relate to mobile banking? As our favorite online encyclopedia states, “mobile banking is a term used for performing balance checks, account transactions, payments, credit applications and other banking transactions through a mobile device. […] Mobile banking has until recently (2010) most often been performed via SMS or the Mobile Web.” In a recent article entitled “4 Trends Shaping the Emerging ‘Superfluid Economy,'” CNN noted that “within a few short years, we may see billions more people connected to the Internet and capable of participating in economic transactions.” For example, “the ‘unbanked’ are being brought into financial inclusion through innovative services like M-PESA [in Kenya] that enable transfer of money via mobile phones.”

I was surprised to learn that several banks in Iran, such as Parsian, Tejarat, Mellat, Saderat, Sepah, Edbi, and Bankmelli offer mobile banking services. Such services also exist in Bahrain (2008), China (2008), Egypt (2010), Pakistan (2009) and Thailand (2005), for example. Kenya’s M-PESA service was launched in 2007 and now includes more than 12 million users. According to a colleague of mine at the World Bank, the compound annual growth rate in mobile banking over the past four years has been over 90%. So while user figures may be low for some of the more recent initiatives, they may very well increase significantly in just a few years. This may thus increase the opportunity costs of shutting off access to SMS. I call this the “Piggy Bank Theory of Digital Activism” to piggy back on Ethan’s “Cute Cat Theory”.

As noted earlier, however, new mobile banking systems don’t use SMS. Instead, they increasingly use a mobile phone’s USSD functionality, which is more secure. So shutting down SMS would not necessarily impact mbanking transactions. Only if cell phone networks are completely blocked would this impact mobile financial services. That said, it is still unclear whether doing so would necessarily create a dilemma for our hypothetical dictator, even in a country with a relatively large mbanking sector. The financial cost may still be negligible in the grand scheme of things. On the other hand, preventing access to mbanking services could backfire if millions of low-income households find their livelihoods at greater risk. We’ve seen that raising taxes on staple goods has prompted serious riots against governments in various countries, for example. So perhaps blocking access to mbanking could create a similar response.

Still, it remains to be seen whether the “Piggy Bank Theory of Digital Activism” is actually valid. On a slightly different note, however, writing about this did prompt the following thought: since USSD functionality is not interrupted when SMS is shut down, could digital activists communicate by exchanging money using mbanking services? For example, transferring $2.3 could be code for meet at location 2 at 3 o’clock. Communicating via numbers does certainly limit the type of information exchanged but the advantage of USSD transactions is that they are secure and encrypted. They also allow for mobility, which is important for digital activism.

ps. many thanks to Fletcher alumni for helping me with the mbanking research!

When the Network Bears Witness: From Photosynth to Allsynth?

I’ve blogged about Photosynth before and toyed around with the idea of an Allsynth platform, the convergence of multiple technologies and sensors for human rights monitoring and disaster response. The idea would be to “stitch” pictures and video footage together to reconstruct evidence in multi-media 3D type format. What if we could do this live and in networked way though?

The thought popped into my head while at the Share Conference in Belgrade recently. The conference included a “Share by Night” track with concerts, live bands, etc., in the evenings. What caught my eye, one night, was not on stage but the dozens of smart phones being held up in the audience to capture the vibes, sounds, movements, etc on stage.

I then thought about that for a moment and the new start up, Color.com, that a colleague of mine co-founded. “Color creates new, dynamic social networks for your iPhone or Android wherever you go. It is meant to be used with other people right next to you who have the Color app on their smartphone. This way, you can take photos and videos together that everyone keeps.”

I was thinking about the concert and all zones bright screens. What if they were streaming live and networked? Meaning one could watch all the streaming videos from one website and pivot between different phones. Because the phones are geo-tagged, I’d be able to move closer to the stage, pivoting to phone users closer to the stage. Why need a film crew anymore? The phones in the audience become your cameras and you could even mix your own music video that way.

I’m at Where 2.0 today and Blaise Agüera y Arcas from Photosynth shared his most recent work, ReadWriteWorld, which he just announced today. “Technically it’s an index-ing, unification, and connection of the world’s geo-linked media. Informally, it’s the magic of:

  • Seeing your photos automatically connected to others;
  • Being able to simply create immersive experiences from your or your friends photos, videos, and panoramas;
  • “Fixing” the world, when the official imagery of your street is out of date;
  • Visually mapping your business, your favorite park, or your real estate for everyone to see;
  • Understanding the emergent information from the density and tagging of media.”
What if we applied this kind of networked, meshed technology to human rights monitoring or disaster response? Granted, most of the world does not own a smart phone. But that won’t always be the case. What if the hundreds of thousands of phones used in Tahrir Square were networked and streaming as if they were covering a concert?

 I don’t know the answer to that question, but I find the idea interesting.

An Open Letter to the Good People at Benetech

Dear Good People at Benetech,

We’re not quite sure why Benetech went out of their way in an effort to discredit ongoing research by the European Commission (EC) that analyzes SMS data crowdsourced during the disaster response to Haiti. Benetech’s area of expertise is in human rights (rather than disaster response), so why go after the EC’s findings, which had nothing to do with human rights?  To our fellow readers who desire context, feel free to read this blog postof mine along with these replies by Benetech’s CEO:

Issues with Crowdsourced Data Part 1
Issues with Crowdsourced Data Part 2

The short version of the debate is this: the EC’s exploratory study found that the spatial pattern of text messages from Mission 4636 in Haiti was positively correlated with building damage in Port-au-Prince. This would suggest that crowdsourced SMS data had statistical value in Haiti—in addition to their value in saving lives. But Benetech’s study shows a negative correlation. That’s basically it. If you’d like to read something a little more spicy though, do peruse this recent Fast Company article, fabulously entitled “How Benetech Slays Monsters with Megabytes and Math.” In any case, that’s the back-story.

So lets return to the Good People at Benetech. I thought I’d offer some of my humble guidance in case you feel threatened again in the future—I do hope you don’t mind and won’t take offense at my unsolicited and certainly imperfect advice. So by all means feel free to ignore everything that follows and focus on the more important work you do in the human rights space.

Next time Benetech wants to try and discredit the findings of a study in some other discipline, I recommend making sure that your own counter-findings are solid. In fact, I would suggest submitting your findings to a respected peer-reviewed journal—preferably one of the top tier scientific journals in your discipline. As you well know, after all, this really is the most objective and rigorous way to assess scientific work. Doing so would bring much more credibility to Benetech’s counter-findings than a couple blog posts.

My reasoning? Benetech prides itself (and rightly so) for carrying out some of the most advanced, cutting-edge quantitative research on patterns of human rights abuses. So if you want to discredit studies like the one carried out by the EC, I would have used this as an opportunity to publicly demonstrate the advanced expertise you have in quantitative analysis. But Benetech decided to use a simple non-spatial model to discredit the EC’s findings. Why use such a simplistic approach? Your response would have been more credible had you used statistical models for spatial point data instead. But granted, had you used more advanced models, you would have found evidence of a positive correlation. So you probably won’t want to read this next bit: a more elaborate “Tobit” correlation analysis actually shows the significance of SMS patterns as an explanatory variable in the spatial distribution of damaged buildings. Oh, and the correlation is (unfortunately) positive.

But that’s really beside the point. As my colleague Erik Hersman just wrote on the Ushahidi blog, one study alone is insufficient. What’s important is this: the last thing you want to do when trying to discredit a study in public is to come across as sloppy or as having ulterior motives (or both for that matter). Of course, you can’t control what other people think. If people find your response sloppy, then they may start asking whether the other methods you do use in your human rights analysis are properly peer-reviewed. They may start asking whether a strong empirical literature exists to back up your work and models. They may even want to know whether your expert statisticians have an accomplished track record and publish regularly in top-tier scientific journals. Other people may think you have ulterior motives and will believe this explains why you tried to discredit the EC’s preliminary findings. This doesn’t help your cause either. So it’s important to think through the implications of going public when trying to discredit someone’s research. Goodness knows I’ve made some poor calls myself on such matters in the past.

But lets take a step back for a moment. If you’re going to try and discredit research like the EC’s, please make sure you correctly represent the other side’s arguments. Skewing them or fabricating them is unlikely to make you very credible in the debate. For example, the EC study never concluded that Search and Rescue teams should only rely on SMS to save people’s lives. Furthermore, the EC study never claimed that using SMS is preferable over using established data on building density. It’s surely obvious—and you don’t need to demonstrate this statistically—to know that using a detailed map of building locations would provide a far better picture of potentially damaged buildings than crowdsourced SMS data. But what if this map is not available in a timely manner? As you may know, data layers of building density are not very common. Haiti was a good example of how difficult, expensive and time-consuming, the generation of such a detailed inventory is. The authors of the study simply wanted to test whether the SMS spatial pattern matched the damage analysis results, which it does. All they did was propose that SMS patterns could help in structuring the efforts needed for a detailed assessment, especially because SMS data can be received shortly after the event.

So to summarize, no one (I know) has ever claimed that crowdsourced data should replace established methods for information collection and analysis. This has never been an either or argument. And it won’t help your cause to turn it into a black-and-white debate because people familiar with these issues know full well that the world is more complex than the picture you are painting for them. They also know that people who take an either-or approach often do so when they have either run out of genuine arguments or had few to begin with. So none of this will make you look good. In sum, it’s important to (1) accurately reflect the other’s arguments, and (2) steer clear of creating an either-or, polarized debate. I know this isn’t easy to do, I’m guilty myself… on multiple counts.

I’ve got a few more suggestions—hope you don’t mind. They follow from the previous ones. The authors of the EC study never used their preliminary findings to extrapolate to other earthquakes, disasters or contexts. These findings were specific to the Haiti quake and the authors never claimed that their model was globally valid. So why did you extrapolate to human rights analysis when that was never the objective of the EC study? Regardless, this just doesn’t make you look good. I understand that Benetech’s focus is on human rights and not disaster response, but the EC study never sought to undermine your good work in the field of human rights. Indeed, the authors of the study hadn’t even heard of Benetech. So in the future, I would recommend not extrapolating findings from one study and assume they will hold in your own field of expertise or that they even threaten your area of expertise. That just doesn’t make any sense.

There are a few more tips I wanted to share with you. Everyone knows full well that crowdsourced data has important limitations—nobody denies this. But a number of us happen to think that some value can still be derived from crowdsourced data. Even Mr. Moreno-Ocampo, the head of the International Criminal Court (ICC), who I believe you know well, has pointed to the value of crowdsourced data from social media. In an interview with CNN last month, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo emphasized that Libya was the first time that the ICC was able to respond in real time to allegations of atrocities, partially due to social-networking sites such as Facebook. He added that, “this triggered a very quick reaction. The (United Nations) Security Council reacted in a few days; the U.N. General Assembly reacted in a few days. So, now because the court is up and running we can do this immediately,” he said. “I think Libya is a new world. How we manage the new challenge — that’s what we will see now.”

Point is, you can’t control the threats that will emerge or even prevent them, but you do control the way you decide to publicly respond to these threats. So I would recommend using your response as an opportunity to be constructive and demonstrate your good work rather than trying to discredit others and botching things up in the process.

But going back to the ICC and the bit in the Fast Company article about mathematics demonstrating the culpability of the Guatemalan government. Someone who has been following your work closely for years emailed me because they felt somewhat irked by all this. By the way, this is yet another unpleasant consequence of trying to publicly discredit others, new critics of your work will emerge. The critic in questions finds the claim a “little far fetched” re your mathematics demonstrating the culpability of the Guatemalan government. “There already was massive documented evidence of the culpability of the Guatemalan government in the mass killings of people. If there is a contribution from mathematics it is to estimate the number of victims who were never documented. So the idea is that documented cases are just a fraction of total cases and you can estimate the gap between the two. In order to do this estimation, you have to make a number of very strong assumptions, which means that the estimate may very well be unreliable anyway.”

Now, I personally think that’s not what you, Benetech, meant when you spoke with the journalist, cause goodness knows the number of errors that journalists have made writing about Haiti.

In any case, the critic had this to add: “In a court of law, this kind of estimation counts for little. In the latest trial at which Benetech presented their findings, this kind of evidence was specifically rejected. Benetech and others claim that in an earlier trial they nailed Milosevic. But Milosevic was never nailed in the first place—he died before judgment was passed and there was a definite feeling at the time that the trial wasn’t going well. In any case, in a court of law what matters are documented cases, not estimates, so this argument about estimates is really beside the point.”

Now I’m really no expert on any of these issues, so I have no opinion on this case or the statistics or the arguments involved. They may very well be completely wrong, for all I know. I’m not endorsing any of the above statements. I’m simply using them as an illustration of what might happen in the future if you don’t carefully plan your counter-argument before going public. People will take issue and try to discredit you in turn, which can be rather unpleasant.

In conclusion, I would like to remind the Good People at Benetech about what Ushahidi is and isn’t. The Ushahidi platform is not a methodology (as I have already written on iRevolution and the Ushahidi blog). The Ushahidi platform is a mapping tool. The methodology that people choose to use to collect information is entirely up to them. They can use random sampling, controlled surveys, crowdsourcing, or even the methodology used by Benetech. I wonder what the good people at Benetech would say if some of their data were to be visualized on an Ushahidi platform. Would they dismiss the crisis map altogether? And speaking of crisis maps, most Ushahidi maps are not crisis maps. The platform is used in a very wide variety of ways, even to map the best burgers in the US. Is Benetech also going to extrapolate the EC’s findings to burgers?

So to sum up, in case it’s not entirely clear, we know full well that there are important limitations to crowdsourced data in disaster response and have never said that the methodology of crowdsourcing should replace existing methodologies in the human rights space (or any other space for that matter). So please, lets not continue going in circles endlessly.

Now, where do we go from here? Well, I’ve never been a good pen pal, so don’t expect any more letters from me in response to the Good People at Benetech. I think everyone knows that a back and forth would be unproductive and largely a waste of time, not to mention an unnecessary distraction from the good work that we all try to do in the broader community to bring justice, voice and respect to marginalized communities.

Sincerely,

Information and Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood: A New Form of Governance?

I recently had the distinct pleasure of participating in a fascination workshop on “Information and Communication Technology in Areas of Limited Statehood: A New Form of Governance?” The workshop was organized by the Frei Universität’s program on Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood and co-directed by Professors Gregor Walter-Drop and Steven Livingston. Update: the result of this meeting, and a follow up meeting in 2012 is a book on the topic to be published by Oxford University Press in 2013.

Throughout the workshop, I kept thinking back to one of my all time favorite books, James Scott’s “Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.”  But while I’ve been fully immersed in the field of crisis mapping since the early days (2007), I haven’t really taken the time to think through the deeper implications of these new tools with respect to governance and especially statehood.

My colleague Gregory Asmolov made the link explicit during his excellent presentation on “Russian Wildfires and Alternative Modes of Governance: The Role of Crowdsourcing in Areas of Limited Statehood.” Here’s a summary:

“Because of it’s geographical size, high degree of corruption, and reliance on an extraction economy, governance by government in Russia is often weak and ineffective. Russian political expert Liliya Shevtzova goes so far as to claim that the current regime is an imitation of governance. The 2010 wildfires demonstrated the limited capacity of the state to provide effective emergency response. Information technologies, and crowdsourcing platforms in particular, fulfill the gap of the limited statehood. At the same time, however, the Russian government is also trying to use ICT to increase its claims to effective governance.”

Gregory and his colleagues in Moscow used the Ushahidi platform to create a “Help Map” during the forest fires. They also set up a call center to facilitate communication between those who needed help and those who were offering it. While I knew this had been one of the most stunning examples of citizen-based crowdsourcing initiatives in Russia, I hadn’t thought through the deeper political implications. Not only were citizens helping themselves because of Russia’s limited statehood, they were actually taking over functions of the state, which the map made very explicit. Gregory noted that some Russian citizens even went out to buy firefighting equipment with their own money to combat the fires themselves. Many official fire stations didn’t even have basic equipment needed to respond. In some ways, these efforts laid bare and indeed exposed the Russian regime as an “imitation of governance.”

The Russian government apparently responded by setting up webcams around the country to show that it was in control and still able to monitor the situation. But as this cartoon shows (from Gregory’s presentation), many in Russia were not buying the pretense. See also this article from Christian Science Monitor that Gregory shared: “Russia’s YouTube Democracy is a Sham.

As James Scott notes in his book Seeing Like a State, “the legibility of a society provides the capacity for larger-scale social engineering, high-modernist ideology provides the desire, the authoritarian state provides the determination to act on that desire, and an incapacitated civil society provides the leveled social terrain on which to build.” By legibility, Scott means the ability of the state to index, search, understand and hence manipulate society. But unlike the past, and thanks to free mapping software and crowdsourcing, society is no longer as incapacitated as it used to be. Indeed, thanks to new free and open source mapping technologies, society is able to define it’s own legibility, the contours of which necessarily reveal the limits of statehood.

Moreover, as I have noted before, the resulting map is often not as profound as the social capital generated between the dozens, often hundreds, of people collaborating on a live crisis map. In turn, this social capital facilitates mass collective action. In other words, social capital is fungible. As Scott notes, “this transformative power resides not in the map, of course, but rather in the power possessed by those who deploy the perspective of that particular map.” In many ways, therefore, the Ushahidi platform is a social-capital and collective-action generating technology.

For more on the Russia Fires projects, I recommend the following links:

The political context of the project:

Disaster Relief 2.0: Between a Signac and a Picasso

The United Nations Foundation, Vodafone Foundation, OCHA and my “alma matter” the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative just launched an important report that seeks to chart the future of disaster response based on critical lessons learned from Haiti. The report, entitled “Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies,” builds on a previous UN/Vodafone Foundation Report co-authored by Diane Coyle and myself just before the Haiti earthquake: “New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflict: The Role of Information and Social Networks.”

The authors of the new study begin with a warning: “this report sounds an alarm bell. If decision makers wish to have access to (near) real-time assessments of complex emergencies, they will need to figure out how to process information flows from many more thousands of individuals than the current system can handle.” In any given crisis, “everyone has a piece of information, everyone has a piece of that picture.” And more want to share their piece of the picture. So part of the new challenge lies in how to collect and combine multiple feeds of information such that the result paints a coherent and clear picture of an evolving crisis situation. What we need is a Signac, not a Picasso.

The former, Paul Signac, is known for using “pointillism,” a technique in which “small, distinct dots of pure color are applied in patterns to form an image.” Think of these dots as data points drawn from diverse pallets but combined to depict an appealing and consistent whole. In contrast, Pablo Picasso’s paintings from his Cubism and Surrealism period often resemble unfinished collages of fragmented objects. A Picasso gives the impression of impossible puzzle pieces in contrast to the single legible harmony of a Signac.

This Picasso effect, or “information fragmentation” as the humanitarian community calls it, was one of the core information management challenges that the humanitarian community faced in Haiti: “the division of data resources and analysis into silos that are difficult to aggregate, fuse, or otherwise reintegrate into composite pictures.” This plagued information management efforts between and within UN clusters, which made absorbing new and alternative sources of information–like crowdsourced SMS reports–even less possible.

These new information sources exist in part thanks to new players in the disaster response field, the so-called Volunteer Technical Communities (VTCs). This shift towards a more multi-polar system of humanitarian response brings both new opportunities and new challenges. One way to overcome “information fragmentation” and create a Signac is for humanitarian organizations and VTCs to work more closely together. Indeed, as “volunteer and technical communities continue to engage with humanitarian crises they will increasingly add to the information overload problem. Unless they can become part of the solution.” This is in large part why we launched the Standby Volunteer Task Force at the 2010 International Conference on Crisis Mapping (ICCM 2010): to avoid information overload by creating a common canvas and style between volunteer crisis mappers and the humanitarian community.

What is perhaps most striking about this new report is the fact that it went to press the same month that two of the largest crisis mapping operations since Haiti were launched, namely the Libya and Japan Crisis Maps. One could already write an entirely new UN/Vodafone Foundation Report on just the past 3 months of crisis mapping operations. The speed with which learning and adaptation is happening in some VTCs is truly astounding. As I noted in this earlier blog post, “Crisis Mapping Libya: This is no Haiti“, we have come a long way since the Haiti response. Indeed, lessons from last year have been identified, they have been learned and operationally applied by VTCs like the Task Force. The fact that OCHA formally requested activation of the Task Force to provide a live crisis map of Libya just months after the Task Force was launched is a clear indication that we are on the right track. This is no Picasso.

Referring to lessons learned in Haiti will continue to be important, but as my colleague Nigel Snoad has noted, Haiti represents an outlier in terms of disasters. We are already learning new lessons and implementing better practices in response to crises that couldn’t be more different than Haiti, e.g., crisis mapping hostile, non-permissive environments like Egypt, Sudan and Libya. In Japan, we are also learning how a more hierarchical society with a highly developed and media rich environment presents a different set of opportunities and challenges for crisis mapping. This is why VTCs will continue to be at the forefront of Disaster 2.0 and why reports like this one are so key: they clearly show that a Signac is well within our reach if we continue working together.